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ABSTRACT
That the Middle East in general, and the relatively business-friendly countries of the Gulf Co-operation  
Council (GCC) in particular, is (and looks to remain for the foreseeable future, despite current political  
developments)  a  major  destination  for  investment  and  internationalization  alike  is  a  fact  without  
question. This is all the more the case for Asia, seeking to further feed its ever-growing economic growth  
and global relevance with overseas ventures and investments; in point of fact, Asia's share of foreign  
direct investment (FDI) flowing into the GCC has been consistently on the rise for years, and looks set to  
overtake that of the OECD countries in the near future.
Internationalization  efforts  into  the  GCC  as  a  national  initiative  tend  to  be,  as  can  be  expected,  
spearheaded by  a vanguard of  government-linked  companies  (GLCs),  usually  assisted in  their  entry  
through various connections, political or otherwise. As large companies with the presumed reliability of  
government backing,  these GLCs tend to be involved in larger-scale,  more critical,  and more iconic  
projects – projects which, as a matter of course, tend to be firmly in the media eye. In the same vein,  
therefore, the large GLCs involved in these projects become easy points of focus for media commentators  
and business analysts alike.
It is a matter of fact, however, that while internationalization may be led by large-scale and attention-
grabbing GLCs, the vast majority of FDI and economic activity is, in the long term, actually entrenched  
in the activities of private companies of various sizes, across various industries – and as such, it must  
logically follow that the study of these companies and their experiences in the Middle East must be of  
paramount relevance to assessing the state of internationalization into the region. In this paper, therefore,  
we focus the ambit of our continuing research into the internationalization efforts of Singapore – an  
important Asian player in the GCC – into the Middle East onto several case studies of Singapore private  
firms in the GCC, and seek to derive observations pertinent  both to the idiosyncrasies of  Singapore  
business in the context of the Middle East, and conclusions pertinent to private firms across the globe  
with an interest in the rich yet cryptic business environments of the Middle East.
INTRODUCTION
It is a statement of simple fact that the Middle East, in recent years, has been a region at the centre of a  
constant whirl  of economic headlines, both positive and negative. Equally undeniable is the fact that,  
despite the varying flavours of these economic headlines, the countries of the Middle East region, and of  
the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in particular, continue to be, and will remain, for the foreseeable 
future,  trading  partners  and  economic  destinations  of  premier  importance.  Nor  does  this  premier 
importance rest merely upon the region's critical role in energy provision for the world, but also upon the 
relatively new and ravenous appetite of the region for trade and investment, and the continuous (and, in 
some  parts,  arguably overboard)  pouring  of  revenue  into  large-scale  infrastructural  development  and 
diversification strategies into a variety of industries.  And both of these relatively recent directions of  
development in the GCC have, arguably, further aligned the region's interest with that of their growing 
number of Asian business partners, equally hungry to feed a fast pace of economic development and ever-
growing global economic relevance.
The GCC's development initiatives, in fact, while still relatively recent, are not a new development per se;  
trade figures from the GCC have been moving away from the long-standing oil-centric economic ties to 
OECD countries since the late 1990s, towards emerging markets across the world and most particularly in  
Asia,  a  function  of  the  growing  demand  in  these  markets  for  not  just  oil,  but  also  for  capital 
(domestically) and economic space and opportunity (internationally). In recent years, especially, owing 
heavily to meteoric growth in China, Asia has overtaken most of the GCC's trading partners in volume  
and prominence; in context, Asia's share of trade with the GCC expanded from just 10% in 1980 to 36% 
by 2009, with growth in trade with Asia at an effective rate of 12% per year since 1980, double the rate of 
growth  with  the  OECD.  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  2011)  Should  this  pattern  continue,  Asia  is  
projected to become the GCC's biggest trading partner by 2017, largely accounted for by India, China,  
and Indonesia, but with significant contributions by other prominent Asian economies – among them 
Singapore, a country with a history of purposeful and persistent international expansion strategies.
The city-state of Singapore occupies, in many ways, a unique position in Asia; a highly developed nation 
with a strong economy, despite its infinitesimally small size and dearth of natural resources. It would 
perhaps not at all be an exaggeration to say that the continued growth of Singapore's economy has largely 
been due to the city state’s recognition at the onset that it needed to plug itself into the global economy,  
and to  subsequent  and continuing efforts  to  meet  this  need.  Possessing  limited  economic  space  and 
subject  to  the  inevitable  rising  cost  structures  of  doing  business  at  home,  means  were  sought  to  
encapsulate  economic  space  overseas  into  which  local  enterprises  could  find  room  to  grow  their  
operations. Regionalization, and later, internationalization, became the city-state's key to unlock new and 
larger markets,  and the policy document, Singapore Unlimited (Singapore Development Board, 1995)  
encapsulated this paradigm shift.
Initial  attempts  to  redistribute  resource-dependent  operations  –  particularly  those  of  private  local 
enterprises (PLEs) – to economic spaces orchestrated by the state in other countries reflected the city-
state's government’s intent to extend the Singapore state enterprise network, or Singapore Inc., to the 
region (Yeoh & Wong,  2005;  How & Yeoh,  2007);  a  hallmark  of  these initiatives  laid in  the  major 
involvement  of  the  Singapore  government  itself,  from  provision  of  management  to  negotiation  of 
incentives aimed at, for the most part, enticing the abovementioned PLEs to expand into these economic  
havens.  As  regionalization  initiatives  gave  way  to  the  current  broader  internationalization  drives, 
however, the marked difference in the cultural, legal, and financial profiles of the city-state's new areas of 
exploration, along with the city-state's own previous experiences with regionalization initiatives, made it  
clear  that  a  similar  strategy of  heavy government  intervention  would  be  suboptimal,  at  best.  Going  
forward, a more firm-oriented approach would have to be taken with regards to internationalization; one  
relying very much more on the capabilities of Singapore firms themselves.
Nowhere, of course, exemplifies a cornucopia of both the abovementioned critical differences in cultural,  
legal, and financial profiles conflated with a fertile bed of economic opportunity more than the GCC. 
Singapore's  approach  to  internationalization  into  the  GCC  combines  the  expected  and  traditional 
trailblazing by government-linked companies (GLCs) with various forms of indirect support for private 
enterprises  through  governmental  organizations  and  otherwise,  and  with  efforts  towards  promoting 
greater  awareness  and  understanding  of,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  interest  in  the  Middle  East 
domestically – a concerted and intentional effort, it can be inferred, towards creating indirect incentives  
for  PLEs  to  enter  the  GCC,  to  encourage  a  self-sustaining  and  critical  mass  of  Singapore  private 
enterprise in this new frontier.
The efficacy of this tactic, however, remains to be seen. That Singapore GLCs have established a strong 
internationalizing presence in the GCC – most especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – is without a 
doubt;  such  GLCs  have  been  involved  in  a  good  number  of  flagship  infrastructural  and  property 
developments, the eventual fate of some of the latter notwithstanding, and arguably have indeed played  
the role of vanguard and trailblazer in a most exemplary fashion. Indeed, in a ranking of the top 100 
Singapore international companies, the top 12 are dominated by GLCs (IE Singapore, 2007) 1,  many of 
which are or have been involved in the GCC. That this is the case is, however, possibly in and of itself a 
matter of concern; suggesting, as it does, evidence towards a confirmation of the perception of a high 
degree of risk aversion among Singapore PLEs – an especial concern towards internationalization into the 
GCC, which, to said Singapore PLEs, represents an unfamiliar region with substantial uncertainties, albeit 
one with high potential return. (Yeoh & How, 2011) In the context of Singapore's internationalization 
efforts, then, the performance of PLEs currently with operations in the GCC must be of great relevance,  
both towards the long-term sustainability of internationalization efforts in the region, and, to the city-state  
particularly,  towards  the  efficacy of  current  methods  of  creating  economic  space  on foreign  soil  for 
(ironically, perhaps) Singapore private firms.
This paper, thus, continues our research series on Singapore’s gambits in the Gulf region, this time with 
the spotlight on the state of Singapore PLEs that have extended operations into the GCC countries. In the 
following section, we examine the performance of these PLEs; first presenting theoretical frameworks 
relevant to the prevalent entry methods taken by said PLEs. We then present three case studies of PLEs 
which have ventured into the GCC region using these methods, and from there discuss and evaluate the 
performance of Singapore PLEs in the GCC; drawing conclusions that, we intend, will be of relevance to  
private enterprises looking to the GCC, and of particular relevance to Singapore’s internationalization 
stratagem and the city-state’s intent to reconfigure the economy for the international marketplace.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Franchising presents an attractive mode of entry PLEs, as it provides, potentially, a lower-risk mode of  
entry into new markets that are of greater uncertainty and risk. Most franchise businesses are designed for  
replication; the franchisor tends to look for suitable franchisees with a similar modus operandi in order to 
ease adaptation of the value chain to the new market. The main challenge of franchising is balancing the 
additional flexibility of operations with the consistency of the company’s brand. For a franchise to be 
recognizable, certain aspects of branding and identity have to remain consistent across all franchises. This  
balancing act of the inevitably necessary adaptation of value chains and operations to suit local conditions 
with consistent branding so as to prevent the dilution of the company’s image and reputation is often the 
deciding  factor  in  how  much  control  the  parent  company  exerts  over  franchisees  –  and  one  that  
sometimes, needless to say, results in bad decisions.
Under master  franchising, in particular,  the franchisee gains expanded methods of generating income 
over that of a normal franchisee, while the franchisor further defrays direct risk. A master-franchising  
agreement involves two main parties, the franchisor and the franchisee. In this model, the franchisor will  
deal with just one franchisee which will be responsible for a pre-specified area (Bashel, 2001). A master  
franchisee can be responsible for tasks such as support and training to maintenance, and receiving fees to  
paying  out  royalties.  The  master  franchise  relationship  is  more  easily  managed  and  enforced  in 
environments with less-developed regulatory frameworks. The flexibility of a master franchisee stems 
from the concept of a global franchisor permitting affiliations with other franchisors (Pizanti & Lerner,  
2003).
Management contracts as a method of entry, on the other hand, has gained recognition in recent years for  
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being a strategy that holds little asset risk, yet promises the possibility of high yields from the outset.  
While there are no standardized management contracts,  it  typically involves the owner assuming full  
ownership of the capital  intensive assets required for the business,  and a company with the in-depth  
knowledge and experience has to bear the responsibility of managing the daily operations for the business  
(Guilding,  2003).  This situation is  particularly common in economies which face managerial  scarcity 
(Brooke, 1985).
Management contracts are attractive because owners stand to benefit from a reasonable amount of cash 
flow without having to operate the business and invest in the necessary human resources (Horwath and  
Horwath, 1988). Operators meanwhile, receive monetary incentives from managing the business, and it  
gains  the  exposure  to  market  its  brand internationally without  investing heavily in  the  capital  assets 
required (Welch and Pacifico, 1990). This strategy theoretically results in both parties being better off but 
drawbacks manifest itself in the agency problem that management contracts create. A divorce in the goals  
of the business for the operator and owner can lead to volatile situations that undermine the fundamental  
assurance and trust required for this strategy to work (Beals and Denton, 2005).
Regarded as a knowledge-intensive business, consultancy adds value to companies because the consultant  
effectively brings to the table in-depth knowledge about a particular topic at hand and helps address the 
issues  that  the  company faces  by driving  knowledge  transfer.  This  value  creation  allows  consulting 
companies to charge a premium on their services. Immense expansion into international markets through 
large office-networks has also been observed in this sector (Jones, 2003). Consulting firms are able to  
enter emerging markets, especially, with a value proposition that local firms are not able to match up to as 
the latter falls behind in terms of knowledge and human capital (Svensson, 2007). Local government  
development  agencies  in  emerging  markets  have  also  begun  to  ride  on  the  value  of  international  
consulting firms through a strategy of active engagement and encouraging direct interaction with local  
firms, which produces opportunities for knowledge transfer (Siggel, 1986).
From the consultancy firm's perspective, of course, cases exist where knowledge transfer becomes too 
costly; these costs being the cost of securing the license for the project, adapting to the local environment  
and the training costs for the locals (Teece, 1981). Companies also have a vested interest in limiting  
knowledge transfer not eroding their proprietary knowledge base in the course of doing business with the  
client, because recipients of their services may easily replicate the knowledge given to them in future  
projects (Svensson, 2007); however, it must be noted that, as is the case with many of the GCC countries,  
this knowledge transfer is arguably of more interest to the host country than the projects themselves.
CASE STUDIES
Company A: Hospitality Developer 
A developer  and  provider  of  luxury  serviced  residences,  Company  A is  a  well-known  large-scale 
international operator, with operations spanning more than 16,000 serviced residence units in cities in 
over 20 countries, including key cities of Europe, Asia Pacific, and the Gulf region. Initially entering the  
GCC, like so many others, through Dubai in 2006, the company wasted no time in attempting to expand 
to other countries in the region, among them Saudi Arabia and Qatar – an attempt, most likely, to garner  
early-mover advantages, and one which arguably succeeded in sidestepping a number of issues, such as  
occupancy inertia, that later entrants experienced. 
Instead, as could perhaps be expected, a number of other issues arose. A reasonably frequent user of  
management contracts as a tool to reduce risk, Company A went one further in the GCC – to date, every 
single project they have undertaken in the region has been under a management contract, rather than any 
equity-based interest, perhaps suggesting a highly cautious approach towards internationalization into this 
region; indeed, interviews suggest that the company feels it is not yet sufficiently familiar with the region 
to invest  in equity stakes.  In the course of  Company A's relatively aggressive expansion,  then,  it  is  
perhaps unsurprising that a host of agency problems were encountered – projects in Dubai fell through 
due to conflicting interests with the initial local partner, whereas expansion plans elsewhere were hobbled 
by other local partners refusing to expand to countries outside their own tribal or political spheres of  
influence, or insisting on exclusivity in their contract with Company A within a certain country or city.  
Both issues were, arguably, further exacerbated by well-known later local financial and socio-political 
shocks; although this was partially due, arguably, to the company's own positioning and target clientele in 
the GCC.
Company A's focus in the GCC was to be on providing premium quality accommodation for international 
expatriates, as opposed to local consumers – a tactic in line with the fact that, in many of the company's 
initial target areas, expatriates did indeed form the majority of the viable customer base, outnumbering the  
local Arabs. As such, Company A saved any need for customization to the local environment, and was 
able  to  offer  its  expatriate  consumers  an  experience  that  was  consistent  with  the  company's  well-
established international brand name. This did, however, mean that in the aftermath of the debt crisis, as 
the  amount  of  business  expatriates  to  some  parts  of  the  region  fell,  so  too  did  occupancy rates  in 
Company A's  residences in those same regions,  albeit  not  as badly as hotel  occupancy rates.  Events  
relating to the Arab Spring, too, had the effect of scuppering this potential customer base, on top of the 
usual concerns as to political stability – in one case, Company A has effectively retreated entirely from 
one such region for precisely these reasons.
From another point of view, however, Company A's strategy of a pure management contract-based entry 
to the GCC then seems almost prescient – in point of fact, even completely defunct projects like those  
mentioned above each created relatively minimal loss for the company. Certainly the company itself is 
undeterred; it continues to aggressively secure new management contracts in the GCC, most recently for a  
property in Oman scheduled to open in 2014, a move further consistent with the company's strategy of, 
effectively, stealing a march on potential competitors. Even considering this relative lack of monetary  
risk,  however,  a rather pertinent  question mark yet  hovers over the long-term viability of a business  
strategy which appears, from above anecdotal evidence, to be quite susceptible to disruptions emanating 
from a local socio-political context – especially in the light of continuing events in the region. It is worth  
noting,  however,  that  Company A itself  may appear  to  be  aware  of  this  same  problem –  plans  are  
apparently underway to allow some amount of customization among individual properties, most notably 
in pricing, and the company's choice of Oman, one of the more cosmopolitan areas in the region, as its 
latest  destination  may be a  conscious  choice with  which  to  avoid  said  socio-political  complications. 
Should this be indeed the case, it is a cautiously positive sign for Company A's growth going forward in 
the GCC.
Company B: Property Developer (Architectural)
Focusing  on  urban  planning  and  project  management,  Company  B  is  one  of  Singapore's  premier 
architectural and design firms, a well-known name in the typically GLC-saturated Singapore property 
development market. Internationally, the company has interests focused largely in Asia, specifically in  
Southeast  Asia,  China,  and India,  but  also spanning parts  of  Africa and,  of  course,  the Middle East.  
Having entered the GCC (specifically, Dubai, like so many others) in 2005, Company B was a reasonably 
recent player in the GCC market, and faced stiff competition from rather larger international architectural  
firms already with a presence in Dubai. The company's entry into Dubai with a contract for an immense  
and iconic commercial development was, in the first place, only made possible through the cultivation of  
relations with a major local property developer – breaking into a market with such entrenched competitors  
would have otherwise been, presumably, quite the Sisyphean task.
As an architectural and design firm, Company B's operations in the GCC are most adequately described 
as consultancy services specializing in providing design expertise and,  in what  the company terms a  
'value-added' proposition, management proficiencies relating to property developments the company has  
designed,  if  required.  Worth noting is  the apparent  alignment of interests  with the  local  context;  the  
management consultancy services provide, arguably,  a valuable source of knowledge transfer to local 
companies and personnel, whereas Company B itself is less than bothered by this knowledge transfer, its  
main value proposition lying in its designs and architectural expertise. This, theoretically, translates into 
two consequences, one positive, the other arguably  less so; the former, greater opportunity to cultivate 
the company's reputation in the region, an important element in a design-based industry; and the latter, a  
somewhat longer-term commitment to individual projects, on average, than most architectural firms. The 
company was,  apparently,  aware  of  these  issues;  it  phases  in  the  availability  of  these  planning  and 
management  services  only  incrementally,  so  as  to  ensure  lower  initial  commitment  and  a  lighter  
investment requirement, showing, perhaps, endemic Singaporean caution, albeit caution not out of place 
for a relatively smaller company. 
In many ways, the initial experiences of the company in the GCC – Dubai in particular – was a study in  
culture  shock.  Company B  has  a  highly  centralized  decision  structure,  with  all  architectural  design 
performed in Singapore, reducing the need for local offices, which are generally more responsible for  
project management. In Dubai, however, like in much of the rest of the GCC, potential clients proved to 
prefer the ability to visit an office of and communicate regularly in person with the company, requiring a  
level of physical presence and responsiveness that Company B's structure did not encourage; especially  
with the high costs of maintaining an office in Dubai at the time, which a relatively smaller company like 
Company B was ill-prepared to sink into a yet uncertain market. In working with local contractors, too, 
Company B found itself faced with international standards more onerous than the company's experience 
with contractors in Singapore and the Southeast Asian region, requiring an exactitude in design drawings 
and labeling resulting in added expense of time and effort on the part of the company. And finally, the  
company faced the familiar problem of finding Singaporean staff willing to work in the region, and staff  
that did make the move experiencing culture shock of their own. In each such case, the company has  
adapted or  made  adjustments;  the  company's  continued presence in  the  GCC attests,  at  least,  to  the  
efficacy of said adjustments.
The debt crisis proved to pose far more of a threat, in fact, to said continued presence. While having 
begun to undertake projects in other parts of the GCC, a major part of Company B's presence at the time 
remained in Dubai, and was, obviously, affected quite adversely by the crisis. Consultancy services, after  
all, require a continuous flow of clients; and in the aftermath of the crisis, property development ground  
to a halt in Dubai, and slowed in a number of the surrounding regions. Staff in the Dubai office were left  
idle, and the company had to go to some lengths to retain them, while at the same time experiencing cash 
flow issues resulting from the stalling and/or renegotiation of several  projects and extreme delays  in 
payment for others – a heavy enough setback, indeed, that some companies may have begun considering 
an exit  strategy.  Perhaps Company B, too,  did so – but  in any case, the company chose the path of  
perseverance in the region, albeit with a focus now on other parts of the GCC, most notably Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar. The company has, in fact, secured several large-scale projects in Doha, the most recent being a  
prime commercial district slated for completion in 2015 – a new area of focus, perhaps, chosen with the 
raised profile of the 2022 World Cup in mind. Company B, it seems, has learned from its experiences and 
moved on; how much exactly it has learned, however, remains to be fully seen. One of its later projects,  
after all, was in Syria.
Company C: Retail (Footwear and Accessories)
Company C is  a  company in  the  business  of  retailing  lines  of  ladies'  footwear,  men's  footwear  and 
accessories, most of which it owns and produces, and operates, at the current time, well over 160 outlets 
across more than 14 countries across the world; a rather significant portion of which – some 40-50 – are  
located in the GCC, underlining the significance of the GCC market to Company C. The term 'operate', in 
this case,  is  also used loosely;  while the company undertakes direct  retailing in its  home country of  
Singapore, its outlets in most other countries are operated by local retailers under franchise agreements.  
Such is the case with all of Company C's outlets in the GCC, from its initial (and initially largest) foray in  
Dubai,  to Abu Dhabi, Qatar,  Bahrain, Oman, and its current largest concentration of outlets in Saudi  
Arabia. Taking these facts together, then, it becomes apparent that the choice of franchisees in the GCC is,  
similarly, highly significant to Company C as well.
As it turns out, Company C's franchisees in the GCC are, in general, quite influential factors indeed on the 
company's fortunes in the GCC. Largely consisting of major local retailers managing multiple brands,  
including several of Company C's most pertinent competitors, these local franchisees hold a great degree  
of clout in the local market, capable of operating on a large scale and commanding premium retail space.  
As such, these local franchisees tend to hold a rather substantial degree of bargaining power, and are  
highly concerned with garnering profit – to the extent of, in Saudi Arabia, dropping brands judged to be 
unprofitable for themselves with no hesitation. It appears to have been, at least partially, with this in mind  
that Company C's ventures into the major markets of the GCC have been through the vehicle of master 
franchising – and furthermore, with agreements with these master franchisees including no franchising  
fees or royalties whatsoever (at least for initial periods), with profit coming from sales of the company's  
product lines to the franchisees;  instead holding the condition that in each case, a certain number of  
outlets be opened within a particular time frame, taking the strategy, apparently, of aggressive and daring 
expansion into the market with the purpose of establishing the company's brand and physical presence in 
the GCC – performed in such a way as to feed the profit-aligned interests of the local partners quite well  
indeed. It is entirely likely that this alignment of interests forms a cornerstone of good relations between  
Company C and its franchisees, which play their vital role of implementing adjustments and adaptation 
strategies fairly well indeed, especially in Saudi Arabia, where, owing to local cultural influences, sales of 
womens' footwear became rather more complicated affairs, with house visits to close sales being more  
frequent while more bags, rather than footwear, were being sold in the retail outlets.
Which is not to say, of course, that Company C experienced no issues at all with local franchisees. The  
company relates an anecdote of haphazard storefronts that  the franchisee initially dismissed as being  
irrelevant to sales, an opinion with the company had to do some convincing to change. Nonetheless, it is  
perhaps partially due to this good working relationship that Company C was relatively unaffected by the 
the region's financial and socio-political storms; retail industries already being somewhat naturally more  
resilient to such shocks, the debt crisis put a temporary halt  to expansion of outlets in the UAE, but  
changed little as far as expansion into other countries, and the company reports that even at the height of 
the crisis, stores in Dubai consistently generated some of the highest revenues in the region, despite being  
in the business of, technically, luxury goods. Sometimes, it seems, fortune favours the bold.
DISCUSSION
The need for adaptation and adjustment to new frontiers is a well-tread track of discussion in discourse on  
internationalization, one that we, too, have touched on to varying degrees in previous papers. That such  
adaptation and adjustment might be rather more pertinent for a private enterprise than a GLC is also fairly  
self-evident – lacking political patronage and national credibility to take as shelter from socio-political  
influences, a private enterprise has to, at least to some degree, forge their own reputation, build their own 
bridges.
In the context of the above case studies, then, such adaptation and adjustment takes two distinct forms;  
modification  of  operational  practices  and  strategies  to  better  suit  local  markets  and  conditions,  and 
alignment of interests with local partners. It is certainly possible to avoid both of these to some extent,  
and thereby incur less adjustment costs and commitment risk; as can be easily observed from the above,  
this is, in fact, precisely what Company A did to an extent, with its choice of target clientele, product 
strategy,  and contract terms. The side effect of this,  however, appears to be a greater vulnerability to  
market shocks, especially those emanating from the socio-political dimension – a local market is, at the  
end of it,  a more stable and captive market than one dependent highly on international financial and 
corporate interests in said market. 
Such adaptation  also  becomes  markedly more  important  for  smaller  private  companies,  which  have 
neither the advantage of size and capital nor of the political patronage GLCs enjoy. That the specific  
market strategies employed by both Companies B and C include attempts to align their interests with 
those of local partners points, arguably, to an implicit understanding of this fact; and both companies have  
certainly had  to  make  operational  adjustments  in  line  with  local  cultural  and  business  standards.  A 
question,  however,  arises  as  to  far  this  process  of  adaptation  actually  ameliorates  business  risk  and 
promotes the performance of a company in the GCC – and it is here that we arrive at decidedly mixed  
results,  which appear to be mostly owing to distinct  industry differences.  Company B, engaged in a  
growth-reliant industry, performed quite well indeed in the GCC, but found itself just as vulnerable to 
shocks engendered by the debt crisis and subsequent socio-political instabilities in the region, albeit with  
a better recovery time than some of its peers experienced; whereas the retail industry Company C, with its  
emphasis more on stable operations, experienced only minor inconveniences, arguably due to the strong 
correlation of interests between the company and its franchisees. The adaptation process alone, it seems,  
is no foolproof shield against the vagaries of uncertainty; but can yet be, depending on the fundamentals  
of one's business, a very valuable tool indeed. 
CONCLUSION
While,  in recent  years,  the subsequent  shocks of the debt  crisis and of the Arab Spring have cooled  
international fervour for the Middle East somewhat, it remains a fact that the region in general, and the 
GCC in particular, yet presents a highly relevant horizon for internationalization and expansion. To many,  
though, it is now clear that companies seeking new horizons in the Middle East should and must now take 
into account the further potential of similar shocks in the future, and put into place contingencies for and 
strategies  to  ameliorate  such  eventualities;  most  especially  for  private  companies,  who  are  most  
vulnerable to such instabilities,  and most  definitely for companies in industries heavily reliant on the 
continued growth of the host market. 
So it has been with many of Singapore's private companies, which by and large have realized this after the 
fact. While many continue to retain an expanding presence in the GCC, a distinct pattern emerges upon a 
simple study of this continued expansion – one in which the casual observer easily notes a drift away 
from areas such as Dubai and Bahrain, towards ostensibly more stable growth markets,  most notably 
Oman and Qatar, as well as a continued movement into Saudi Arabia, the largest market in the region. 
Despite, in many cases, a demonstrated vulnerability to financial and socio-political shocks, this choice of 
future directions appears to imply,  instead, yet  another expression of the Singapore tendency towards 
caution  and  conservative  movement,  having,  to  arguably,  more  in  common  with  avoidance  than 
adaptation. This may perhaps cast some doubt upon the viability of any internal measures being taken to 
reduce said vulnerability, which would seem to be a rather paramount concern for real long-term and  
sustainable internationalization into the region. Such measures being, of course, internal, only time and 
the test itself will tell – a test which, we likely all hope, will not be administered once more to the region  
any time soon. The state of Singapore's private enterprises in the GCC appears to be, at least at the current 
time, a healthy one – albeit one that should, perhaps, append a bracketed question mark to the end of that  
assessment.
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